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On January 27, 2010, in his State of the Union address,
President Obama declared:
With all due deference to separation of powers, last week
the Supreme Court reversed a century of law that I believe
will open the floodgates for special interests-including
foreign corporations-to spend without limit in our
elections. I don't think American elections should be
bankrolled by America's most powerful interests, or worse,
by foreign entities.
1
In that succinct comment, the former professor of
constitutional law at the University of Chicago Law School
made three important and accurate observations about the
Supreme Court majority's opinion in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission2: First, it did reverse a century of law;
second, it did authorize unlimited election-related expenditures
by America's most powerful interests; and, third, the logic of the
* Associate Justice (Ret.), United States Supreme Court. This essay is the text of a lecture
delivered at the University of Arkansas Clinton School of Public Service on May 30, 2012.
1. Press Release, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address, http:/iwww
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address (Jan. 27, 2010).
2. - U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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opinion extends to money spent by foreign entities. That is so
because the Court placed such heavy emphasis on "the premise
that the First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of
political speech based on the speaker's identity." 3 Indeed, the
opinion expressly stated, "We find no basis for the proposition
that, in the context of political speech, the Government may
impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers."4 Somewhat
inconsistently, however, the Court also stated that it would not
reach the question whether the Government has a compelling
interest "in preventing foreign individuals or associations from
",5influencing our Nation's political process.
Today, instead of repeating arguments that I advanced in
my dissent from the Citizens United decision, I shall mention
four post-decision events that provide a basis to expect that the
Court already has had second thoughts about the breadth of the
reasoning in Justice Kennedy's opinion for a five-man majority.
The first relates to Justice Alito, the second to Chief Justice
Roberts, the third to the Court's unanimous summary decision a
few months ago in a case upholding the constitutional validity of
a prohibition on campaign expenditures by a non-citizen
Harvard Law School graduate,6 and the fourth to my own further
reflection about the rights of non-voters to influence the
outcome of elections.
I.
Justice Alito-who was in the audience for the 2010 State
of the Union address and had joined the majority opinion in
Citizens United-reportedly mouthed the words "not true" in
response to the President's comment that I have quoted.7
Although I have not discussed the matter with him, I think
Justice Alito must have been reacting to the suggestion that the
opinion would open the floodgates for corporations controlled
3. Id. at 905.
4. Id. at 899.
5. Id. at 911.
6. Appellants' Jurisdictional Statement, Bluman v. FEC, No. 11-275 (U.S. Sept. 1,
2011) [hereinafter Jurisdictional Statement].
7. Adam Liptak, For Justices, Attending Address Can Be Trial, 170 N.Y. Times A-11
(Jan. 24, 2012).
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by foreign entities as well as those wholly owned by American
citizens.
I draw that inference because, instead of responding
directly to my dissenting opinion's comment that the Court's
reasoning would have protected the World War II propaganda
broadcasts by Tokyo Rose,8 Justice Kennedy stated that the
Court was not reaching the question. 9 Given the fact that the
basic proposition that undergirded the majority's analysis is that
the First Amendment does not permit the regulation of speech-
or of expenditures supporting speech-to be based on the
identity of the speaker or his patron, it is easy to understand why
the President would not have understood that ambiguous
response to foreclose First Amendment protection for
propaganda financed by foreign entities.
But Justice Alito's reaction does persuade me that in due
course it will be necessary for the Court to issue an opinion
explicitly crafting an exception that will create a crack in the
foundation of the Citizens United majority opinion. For his
statement that it is "not true" that foreign entities will be among
the beneficiaries of Citizens United offers good reason to predict
there will not be five votes for such a result when a case arises
that requires the Court to address the issue in a full opinion.
And, if so, the Court must then explain its abandonment of, or at
least qualify its reliance upon, the proposition that the identity of
the speaker is an impermissible basis for regulating campaign
speech. It will be necessary to explain why the First Amendment
provides greater protection to the campaign speech of some non-
voters than to that of other non-voters.
II.
A few months after its decision in Citizens United, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 2339B of Title 18
of the U. S. Code, which makes it a federal crime to "knowingly
provid[e] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist
8. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 947 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 911 (majority opinion).
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organization.""' Specifically, in his opinion for the Court in
Holder v. Jlumanitarian Law Project-which I joined-Chief
Justice Roberts concluded that Congress can prohibit support to
terrorist organizations in the form of expert advice intended only
to support the group's nonviolent activities.11 As Justice Breyer
correctly noted in his dissent, the proposed speech at issue was
the kind of political activity to which the First Amendment
ordinarily offers its strongest protection. 12 Nevertheless, under
the Chief Justice's opinion, the fact that the proposed speech
would indirectly benefit a terrorist organization provided a
sufficient basis for denying it First Amendment protection.'
3
If political speech made by an American citizen may be
denied the protection of the First Amendment because it would
produce an indirect benefit for a terrorist organization, I think it
necessarily follows that such speech made or financed by the
terrorist organization itself would receive no constitutional
protection. While a reader of Justice Kennedy's opinion in
Citizens United-specifically, one who notes his reliance on the
proposition that "the First Amendment generally prohibits the
suppression of political speech based on the speaker's
identity"14 -might well have assumed that the identity of the
speaker should not dictate the result, Chief Justice Roberts's
later opinion in Humanitarian Law Project surely demonstrates
that the Court will not treat campaign speech by terrorist
organizations like speech by ordinary voters. The Chief Justice's
opinion in Humanitarian Law Project is consistent with the
Court's 1987 holding in Meese v. Keene15 that propaganda
disseminated by agents of foreign governments-regardless of
whether the government is friendly or unfriendly or whether the
message is accurate or inaccurate-may be subjected to
regulation that would be impermissible if applied to speech by
American citizens.' 6 The identity of a speaker as either a
10. See Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, _ U.S. ,, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712
(2010) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1)).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 2732 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 2724-30 (majority opinion).
14. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905.
15. 481 U.S. 465 (1987).
16. Id. at 469-71,477--85.
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terrorist or just the agent of a friendly ally provides a sufficient
basis for providing less constitutional protection to his speech.
Could the Court possibly conclude that expenditures by
terrorists or foreign agents in support of a political campaign
merit greater First Amendment protection than their actual
speech on political issues? I think not. Indeed, I think it likely
that when the Court begins to spell out which categories of non-
voters should receive the same protections as the not-for-profit
Citizens United advocacy group, it will not only exclude terrorist
organizations and foreign agents, but also all corporations
owned or controlled by non-citizens, and possibly even those in
which non-citizens have a substantial ownership interest. Where
that line will actually be drawn will depend on an exercise of
judgment by the majority of members of the Court, rather than
on any proposition of law identified in the Citizens United
majority opinion.
III.
A few months ago, the Court affirmed an extremely
important decision by a three-judge federal district court sitting
in the District of Columbia. Two residents of New York
City-a Canadian citizen who recently had graduated from
Harvard Law School and was employed by a New York law
firm, and a medical resident at the Beth Israel Medical Center in
New York who was a dual citizen of Israel and Canada-wished
to express their political views by contributing money to certain
candidates for federal and state office and by spending money
independently to advocate for the election of their preferred
candidates.' 8 They brought suit against the Federal Election
Commission challenging as unconstitutional the federal statute
that makes it unlawful for them to engage in these activities.
19
Relying on the Court's opinion in Citizens United-and
especially on the Court's condemnation of speaker-based
17. Blunan v. Fed Election Commn., No. 11-275 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2012), affg. 800 F.
Supp. 2d 281 (D. D.C. 2011).
18. Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 285; Jurisdictional Statement at 5.
19. Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 285 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441e(a)); Jurisdictional
Statement at 6.
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restrictions on political speech-they contended that the federal
statute's application to their proposed activities would violate
their freedom of speech under the First Amendment.
20
The district court agreed with the plaintiffs that the federal
statute barred their proposed activity. 21 According to that court,
the statute draws a basic distinction between campaign speech
and express advocacy, on the one hand, and issue advocacy, on
the other hand.2 2 It prohibits foreign nationals from making
expenditures to expressly advocate the election or defeat of a
political candidate, but not from engaging in advocacy regarding
policy or other issues.23 The district court pointed out that the
leading case protecting the First Amendment rights of
corporations-First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti -had
noted that "'speak[ing] on issues of general public interest' is a
'quite different context' from 'particiyation in a political
campaign for election to public office. While issue advocacy
by foreign nationals may well be protected by the First
Amendment, the district court held that Congress did not violate
plaintiffs' First Amendment rights by criminalizing their
26proposed activities to support particular candidates.
Invoking the Supreme Court's mandatory jurisdiction
pursuant to § 403(a)(3) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
of 2002, the plaintiffs filed a direct appeal in the Supreme
27Court. They argued that the district court's decision was
inconsistent with Citizens United.28 Given the Supreme Court's
reliance in Citizens United on the proposition that the First
Amendment "has its fullest and most urgent application to
speech uttered during a campaign for political office, 2 9 coupled
20. Pl.'s Memo. in Support of Pl.'s Mot. for S.J. & in Opposition to Def.'s Mot. to
Dismiss at 28-29, Bluman v. Fed. Election Commn., http://www.fec.gov/law/litigation/
blumanblumanMSJ and Memo.pdf (D. D.C. Jan. 18, 2011) (No. 1:10-cv-1766)
(accessed July 2, 2012; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
21. Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 283, 285.
22. Id. at 284-85, 290.
23. Id.
24. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
25. Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 290 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n. 26).
26. Id. at 283, 292.
27. Jurisdictional Statement at 1.
28. Id. at 19, 20.
29. 130 S. Ct. at 898 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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with the assumption that the plaintiffs were free to engage in
issue advocacy, that argument surely had merit. While the
appeal unquestionably provided the Court with an appropriate
opportunity to explain why the President had misinterpreted the
Court's opinion in Citizens United-assuming that what the
President said was in fact "not true," as Justice Alito had
suggested-the Court instead took the surprising action of
simply affirming the district court without comment and without
dissent. 30 That action, unlike an order denying a petition for
certiorari, was a ruling on the merits. While such a summary
affirmance has less precedential weight than fully argued cases,
it remains a judgment that all other federal courts, as well as
state courts, must respect in resolving future cases.
31
Therefore, notwithstanding the broad language used by the
majority in Citizens United, it is now settled, albeit unexplained,
that the identity of some speakers may provide a legally
acceptable basis for restricting speech. Moreover, and again
despite the broad language in the majority's opinion, I think it is
also now settled law that, at least for some speakers, Congress
may impose more restrictive limitations on campaign speech
than on issue advocacy. The rule that Congress may not "restrict
the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance
the relative voice of others' ' 2 remains applicable to issue
advocacy, but does not necessarily apply to campaign speech.
Indeed, as a matter of common sense there is no reason why that
proposition must apply to both. Given its implicit recognition of
a valid constitutional distinction between issue advocacy and
campaign speech, it would be appropriate for the Court to
reexamine whether it is ever permissible to impose the same
restrictions on all candidates in order to equalize their
opportunities to persuade voters to vote for them. Recent history
illuminates the importance of that question.
30. Supreme Court of the United States, Order List (Jan. 9, 2012) (noting "summary
disposition" in Bluman v. Fed. Election Commn., No. 11-275).
31. See Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) ("Summary affirmances ... do
prevent lower courts from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise issues presented
and necessarily decided by those actions.").
32. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49
(1975)).
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IV.
During televised debates among the Republican candidates
for the presidency, the moderators made an effort to allow each
speaker an equal opportunity to express his or her views. If there
were six candidates on the stage, it seemed fair to let each speak
for about ten minutes during each hour. Both the candidates and
the audience would surely have thought the value of the debate
to have suffered if the moderators had allocated the time on the
basis of the speakers' wealth, or if they had held an auction
allowing the most time to the highest bidder.
Yet that is essentially what happens during actual
campaigns in which rules equalizing campaign expenditures are
forbidden. There is a finite amount of prime television time
available for purchase by candidates during the weeks before an
election. Rules equalizing access to that time-rules providing
the same limits on expenditures on behalf of both candidates-
would enhance the quality of the candidates' debates. The
quality of debate on important public issues in the Supreme
Court is enhanced by imposing limits on the length of the
adversaries' briefs and the time allowed for their oral arguments.
Why shouldn't we expect comparable rules to have the same
beneficial effect when applied to campaign debates? Of course,
in both contexts the rules must allow each party an adequate
opportunity to express his or her point of view.
It is judge-made doctrine rather than the Constitution's text
that is the source of the all-encompassing prohibition against
rules imposing any limit on the amount of money that candidates
or their supporters may spend to finance speech during political
campaigns. Congress's enactment of the so-called "Millionaire's
Amendment" of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act made it
clear that our elected representatives recognize the value of such
rules. Nevertheless the same five Justices who decided Citizens
United invalidated that amendment, reasoning that "it is a
dangerous business for Congress to use the election laws to
influence the voters' choices." 33 Under such reasoning I suppose
moderators of the Republican debates were engaging in a
"dangerous business" of using their authority "to influence
33. Davis v. Fed Election Commn., 554 U.S. 724, 742 (2008).
BEYOND CITIZENS UNITED
voters' choices" whenever they tried to equalize the candidates'
time to respond to questions.
V.
Finally, I want to speculate about how former Speaker of
the House Tip O'Neill would probably have reacted to the
Court's decision in Citizens United to overrule Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce. 34 One of his most frequently
quoted observations about the democratic process was his
comment that "[a]ll politics is local.",35 In Austin, the Court
upheld the constitutionality of a Michigan statute that prohibited
corporations from using their general treasury funds to finance
campaign speech.36 The statutory prohibition was important not
only because it limited the use of money in Michigan elections,
but also because it limited the ability of out-of-state entities to
influence the outcome of local elections in Michigan.
Of course the respondents in that case, the Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, represented corporations doing business
in that state, but presumably a number of them were foreign
corporations that did substantial business in states other than
Michigan. From the point of view of Michigan voters, those
corporate non-voters were comparable to the non-voting foreign
corporations that concerned President Obama when he criticized
the Citizens United majority opinion. A state statute that limits
the influence of non-voting out-of-state entities-whether
corporate or human-is consistent with Tip O'Neill's emphasis
on the importance of local issues in political campaigns. On the
other hand, a rule that opens the floodgates for foreign campaign
expenditures will increase the relative importance of out-of-state
speakers and minimize the impact of voters' speech that
addresses purely local problems.
The decision to overrule Austin was therefore significant
not only because it enhanced the relative importance of cash in
34. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
35. See Tip O'Neill with Gary Hymel, All Politics is Local, and Other Rules of the
Game (Adams Media Corp. 1995); see also Mario M. Cuomo, The Last Liberal, 160 N.Y.
Times §7 at 8 (Mar. 11, 2001) (reviewing John A. Farrell, Tip O'Neill and the Democratic
Century (Little, Brown & Co. 2001)).
36. Austin, 494 U.S. at 654-55.
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contested elections, but also because it enhanced the relative
influence of non-voters. In candidate elections-unlike debates
about general issues such as tax policy, global warming,
abortion, or gun control-the interest in giving voters a fair and
equal opportunity to hear what the candidates have to say is a
matter of paramount importance.
If the First Amendment does not protect the right of a
graduate of Harvard Law School to spend his own money to
support the candidate of his choice simply because his Canadian
citizenship deprives him of the right to participate in our
elections, the fact that corporations may be owned or controlled
by Canadians-indeed, in my judgment, the fact that
corporations have no right to vote-should give Congress the
power to exclude them from direct participation in the electoral
process. While I recognize that the members of the Supreme
Court majority that decided Citizens United disagree with my
judgment on this issue, I think it clear-for all the reasons
explained in my Citizens United dissent and earlier in this talk-
that their disagreement is based not on some controlling rule of
law, but rather on their differing views about what rule will best
serve the public interest.
